Introduction
Stream ciphers are important encryption algorithms in symmetric encryption system. There are two kinds of stream ciphers: synchronous stream ciphers and self-synchronous stream ciphers. Many stream ciphers are used widely in real life. The security of stream ciphers has been paid attention to for many years because of their importance. Therefore the design and analysis of stream ciphers have been hot research topics. Many old stream ciphers are considered insecure because they are broken or nearly broken. Therefore efforts have been made in recent years to find secure and fast stream ciphers.
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In 1999, the European Commission developed a project NESSIE [1] . The main purpose of this project is to call for good stream cipher primitives that are obtained after an open call and evaluation. But after several rounds of evaluation no secure enough stream ciphers were selected.
Many designs of old stream ciphers are based on linear feedback shift registers (LFSR) and Boolean functions.
LFSRs have many advantages, so they are used widely in different circuits. For many years LFSRs have been one of the most important components for constructing keystream generators. But LFSRs have a big disadvantage, that is, the internal states are linearly dependent. This property can be exploited successfully by algebraic attack. In 2002,
Courtois N. successfully broke the stream cipher Toyocrypt using algebraic attack for the first time [2] . Later, he successfully broke stream ciphers based on LFSRs and Boolean functions also using algebraic attack [3, 4] . All these facts made the security of old stream ciphers suspected.
In 2004, ECRYPT-the European Network of Excellence for Cryptology, started a new stream cipher project called eSTREAM [5] . The objective of this project is to call for secure and fast stream cipher algorithms. There were 35 candidate stream ciphers submitted in 2005. Many candidate stream ciphers of the project avoid using old designs but adopt new design. Some designs use LFSRs, nonlinear feedback shift registers (NLFSR) and Boolean functions such as Grain [6] . It is necessary to analyze the security of these candidate stream cipher structures.
Distinguishing attack is a method often used in analyzing the security of stream ciphers such as Refs. [7−9] .
The purpose of distinguishing attack is to try to distinguish the observed keystream from a truly random sequence.
Distinguishing attack is often weaker than key recovery attack. In some cases distinguishing attack can be turned into key recovery attack. Generally, there are two manners to achieve distinguishing attack: the first one is distinguishing probability distribution of keystream output from a uniform distribution directly; the second one is using linear approximation equations with noticeable biases and parity checks.
To the authors' knowledge, there are a few analytical results available about the security of stream cipher structure based on LFSRs, NLFSRs and filter Boolean functions. Maximov A. analyzed the security of this structure [10] . Berbain C. et al. cryptanalyzed the stream cipher Grain [11] . In this paper, the security of this new stream cipher structure will be analyzed. A distinguishing attack on this structure based on the idea similar to that of Ref. [8] is given, however, we use a new method different from Ref. [8] . The method in Ref. [8] can not be used to the structure considered in this paper. In Ref. [8] , the entries of the parity check equation are considered as a vector. In this paper, the input variables of the filter Boolean function are considered as a vector. This vector is written as the bit-wise XOR of two vectors. Then all these vectors which correspond to the parity check equations are written as the bit-wise XOR of two vectors. Using the parity check equations we can deduce that the distribution of all these vectors is nonuniform. This is the key to achieve our distinguishing attack. Our attack implies that the newly proposed stream cipher structure is vulnerable to distinguishing attack.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, some necessary preparations for our attack are given. In Section 3, our distinguishing attack is described in detail. In Section 4, an example is demonstrated to show the validity of our method, and Section 5 gives our conclusion.
Preliminaries
Description of structure
In this paper we consider binary additive synchronous stream ciphers based on LFSR, NLFSR and filter Boolean function or some other structures that can be reduced to this structure. The structure is shown in Fig.1 .
Let the length of LFSR be n, the feedback polynomial of LFSR be f(x) and the internal state of LFSR be 
Fig.1 Structure based on LFSR, NLFSR and filter Boolean function
Hypothesis testing
There are two hypotheses: H 0 denotes the hypothesis that the obtained data comes from the considered cipher and H 1 denotes that the data comes from a random source. Let X 1 ,X 2 ,…,X k be k independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables from the alphabet X. The distribution of random variable X i is denoted by
where Pr denotes the probability, x i denotes the observed value, 1≤i≤k. The distribution of 
, where c is a fixed nonnegative number. Let α=D 0 ( C ) and β=D 1 (C) be the error probabilities corresponding to C, where C is the complement of C. Let α′ and β′ be any other set with associated error probabilities. If α′≤α, then β′≥β. This says the critical region C is optimal.
For more detailed content about hypotheses testing, refer to Ref. [12] . Set α=β in our attack, so c=1 [8] . Then the inequality in the expression of C as described above can be rewritten as
In order to compute the needed sample number, the notion of statistical distance is introduced in Ref. [13] . If the distributions are smooth, then the sample number N that we need to observe satisfies N≈ε −2 [13] .
黄小莉 等:对一种新的序列密码结构的密码分析 1259
Our Attack
The first step of our attack is to find low-weight multiples of the linear feedback polynomial. The weight of a binary polynomial is defined as the number of its nonzero coefficients. These multiples generate the same linear output as that of the original linear feedback polynomial. The goal is to obtain a number of polynomial multiples of low-weight and of as small degree as possible. This method has been used frequently in cryptanalysis. Let ⊕ denote the operation of binary bit-wise XOR and ⊕ denote the sum of bit-wise XOR in the following section.
Finding low-weight polynomial multiples
There are some literatures on finding low-weight multiples of a polynomial. In Ref. [14] an algorithm of finding w-weight multiples of the polynomial f(x) of degree d and its time complexity are given. We adopt the method in Ref. [14] . It is stated that the critical degree when the multiples of weight w begin to appear is
. The polynomial residue algorithm of finding polynomial multiples in Ref. [14] is as follows.
Input: A binary polynomial f(x), maximum degree n of polynomial multiples and a positive integer k;
(1) Compute and store the residues x i modf(x), 1≤i≤n. 
The second step of our attack is to make a distinguishing attack. In the second step two cases are considered.
The case that uses one low-weight polynomial multiple
Suppose that a polynomial multiple of weight w of the feedback polynomial f(x) has been found. 
So Eq.(4) can be written as 
B
which is generated by these nonuniformly-distributed vectors is also nonuniform. Therefore the nonuniform distribution of Z t can be used to make a distinguishing attack. The detailed steps of our distinguishing attack are as follows:
1. Find a low-weight multiple of the linear feedback polynomial f(x). Let the weight be w.
Compute the distribution D 0 (Z t ).
3. Compute the sample number N needed to be observed. We can compute D 0 (Z t ) by building a trellis to lower computational complexity like Ref. [15] .
Creating a trellis
Now we give a simple example to explain how to create a trellis to compute D 0 (Z t ). Assume that the filter Boolean function is
If a 3-weight multiple of the linear feedback polynomial is considered, we can write Using this method, we can easily compute the distribution D 0 (Z t ) as shown in Table 1 . 
Conclusion
The security of a recently proposed new structure of stream ciphers has been studied in this paper. This structure is based on LFSR, NLFSR and a filter Boolean function. A distinguishing attack against this structure is
given. An example is presented to show the validity of our attack, but our method is invalid for Grain because D 0 (Z t ) is uniform. But if D 0 (Z t ) is nonuniform when another filter Boolean function is used, our method is valid.
Our results demonstrate that the new stream cipher structure may suffer heavier security threats than it has been revealed, and our method should be taken into account in designing new structures of stream ciphers. According to this attack, it is necessary to ensure that D 0 (Z t ) is uniform in designing stream ciphers based on LFSR, NLFSR and filter Boolean functions. Otherwise, it suffers the distinguishing attack as described in this paper.
